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Words are not enough to express the global financial melt-down. Is it   
foreclosure , bad debt, bank failure, tentacles, stock market crash, share 
nose-diving, investors havoc or suicide or death- trap, government inability, 
business failure, mortgage failure, Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac phenomenon, 
bait and switch game, etc; the insider knowledge or information, the 
scapegoat? This is the problem investigated in this study. Therefore, the 
hypothesis is that the insider knowledge of the manager does not cause the 
global financial melt-down. The method is analytical using desk research. 
The finding is that the insider information possessed by the manager 
informed the manipulation of firms, securities, risky business, terms, prices, 
etc, for their benefit to the detriment of investors and therefore caused the 
financial melt-down. Finally, the major recommendation is that corporate 
governance needs reforms for tighter control and application of full 
oversight functions on investment bankers. 
Introduction 
It is a good thing to develop so that poverty will be minimized, hence, the 
need for investment. But the investors are at risk of losing their investment or 
capital on account of mis-management by managers of the investments, the 
“Leviathan”. Can the insider knowledge or information possessed by the 
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managers to run the firm, stocks, etc, their own way (risky for quick profits) 
against the safety of the investors’ funds be the scapegoat? How can it be 
tamed? For example, the capital monitoring of corporate managers is 
expected to curb the ugly insider information (Amadasu, 2009a). To what 
extent do your shares (investor’s) represent a minor fraction of the total 
shares outstanding? Voting cannot help either because you will be treated 
with virtual impunity. Ritual Moreover, the rules of corporate governance 
will stack the deck in management’s favour.  
 If one sues for malfeasance, the business judgment rule gives the board of 
directors broad legal discretion to use their business judgment for protection 
from second-guessing of shareholders (Amadasu, 2009b). Selling one’s 
shares in the open market is at a loss as managers must have driven down the 
share value. Hiring the best team of lawyers or solicitors to defeat the firm 
and drag oneself in the mud is not a good option. This is because of the fact 
that you would have borne all the costs enough to make the firm efficient and 
the benefit going to other shareholders. Takeover may not even help because 
of takeover wars (like the 1980’s) and difficulties. The use of debt (as bond 
holders can ask for higher interest rates or restrictive bond covenants) to curb 
management and reduce agency costs is another option (Cook and Easter 
wood 1994). This is because of the ability of bond holders to seize control 
easily in bankruptcy and force employees out into the labour market. What of 
the aftermath? 
Therefore, the insider knowledge or information is being investigated as the 
scapegoat for financial melt-down to tame it. The hypothesis is that the 
insider knowledge of the managers did not cause the global financial melt-
down. The analysis using desk research follows after the literature review 
and thereafter, a concluding part. 
Literature review 
Corporate governance intractable problem arose from corporate law in the 
U.S in separation of ownership and control and increased by the institutional 
rules promulgated by American courts legislators and regulators (Roe 1990, 
1993, Grund fest, 1990, Black, 1992, Bhide, 1993). A single investor cannot 
single-handedly deal with or remove the executive that has erred by 
committing malfeasance. If the investor wants to play the role of the 
activist’s by hostile takeover bid or collecting proxies in a proxy fight 
(Ikenberry and Lakonishok, 1993, Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; Comment 
and Schwert, 1995; Cook and Easter wood, 1994) through voting their shares 
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at the annual general meeting, it is a costly move. Even, the “poison pills” 
recent legislative, defensive innovation, whereby there is a conditional, 
discounted voting security purchased rights accruing to existing shareholder 
making a hostile offer, lower the probability of a success. 
Also, note that the shareholders elect the board of directors (Jensen and 
Warrner, 1988; Holderness and Sheehan, 1991; Byrd and Hickman, 1992, 
Shivdasani, 1993; Brook and Rao; 1994; Pound 1995; Bernstein, 1994; 
Miller 1994) to hire, monitor and compensate the executives of firms. 
These shareholders are atomistic in the sense that each owns less than 1% 
and one out of them may not be in a position to monitor and discipline 
management. Agreed that shareholders (the last claimants after creditors and 
employees to firm’s profits. This is optional and morally defensive) are risk-
averse and have well-diversified portfolio with respect to any particular firm 
and therefore can support long-term, risky, investment of firms (than 
managers or other stakeholders) which makes for a firm’s future (Fama and 
Jensen, 1985). But no unilateral action of one shareholder to bear all costs 
whereas the benefits are widely dispersed to all shareholders (which should 
have taken part in a collective action), a free ride indeed! Even corporate 
governance rules will not allow institutional investors to band together to 
challenge management. This environment is paradoxical but it is the truth. 
Therefore, one understands the ambitious seizure of effective control by the 
managers inside the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Harrington and Prokop, 
1993) supposed to run the business or invest properly in the best interest of 
the investors now turn around to do whatever they like through unethical 
practices to satisfy their whims and caprices (Osiegbu, 2008; Okereke, 2008; 
Lawal, 2008; Amadasu, 2009b). Finally, such may result in financial melt-
down for the investors or backlash after growth (James, 2001; Dodd, 2007). 
Analysis  
The hypothesis is that the insider knowledge of the manager did not cause the 
global financial melt-down. Looking at it critically, the researcher believes 
that it is the gargantuan investment somewhere or all over the place that can 
no longer be supported and had to crash-land that caused the global financial 
melt-down. The sub-primes or sub- prime loans or sub-prime mortgages were 
not the mainstream but related events of the holocaust. Again, the time for 
this was not suddenly around August 2001 in the United States of America 
but before then and the tentacles were already brewing. When it happened its 
tentacles spread globally, even to Nigeria. What was the role of insider 
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information or management or managers of funds, businesses, etc? Certainly, 
they (the managers) were not mute, watching helplessly the tumbling down. 
They can be said to have pulled the trigger and released the first bullet. All 
these do not support the hypothesis exempting the insider knowledge of the 
manager. The sudden change in the mortgage terms and price/value of the 
mortgages, unfavourably and downward cannot but be initiated by them for 
brisk business, high profits fraught with high risks. One understands 
therefore, the inability of the mortgage owners or debtors and even creditors 
and their properties or assets, nose-diving resulting in foreclosures, toxic 
assets, job losses, inaccessible loans, banks’ insolvency threats across the 
world and all that. Turmoil indeed! 
The trail of the financial melt-down is on and on, it is a phenomenon 
requiring oversight function, regulation, something beyond financial 
governance, and involving environment, health and trade degradations. Look 
at it again, bank crises spill over to a number of things namely: equity 
market, stock market, firms/business reducing their values and stability: 
obligations, contracts with default or breach: governments and financial 
houses/systems with instability shocks: consumers with reduced demand 
from reduced purchasing power of money and job losses: the environment 
with degradation of health hazards from increased demand on it. Apparently, 
the environment or the real sector is the saving or grace to turn to but there is 
the need to use finance to exploit it and reconstruct the damages too. The 
financial managers with their insider knowledge cannot pass the buck as they 
were in the mainstream in managing of these unfolding events. They knew 
from their insider information backed by their over-ambition, limited liability 
status, board of directors’ business judgment, shareholders’ atomistic 
characteristic of ineffectiveness, bankruptcy rule, business judgment, tax 
havens and other terms applying which may not be explicit in insurance and 
other business. The question that remains is how to tame this “Leviathan”. 
Since 0.06% additional increase in troubled, unpaid loans or sub-prime 
mortgages can cause global financial melt-down like the present global 
economic situation, the singular action of underwriters in changing prices and 
terms of investment (term structure) cannot be over-emphasized. The insider 
knowledge of the managers in this regard was underscored by void tighter 
corporate governance and lukewarm oversight functions. The riskiest 
mortgage or security goes to highest yield-seeking over-leveraged hedge 
funds or buyers. The mortgage or security offers or collects collateralized 
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debt and credit derivatives. Why going for the riskiest business? If the 
motivation is for highest yield, how reliable is this in the macroeconomic 
policy imperfection and ineffectiveness in developing countries and the 
protectionism of the developed countries? Certainly, the action of the insider 
or manager’s expression of his knowledge is to the detriment of the fund 
owners or households or shareholders. The capital involved in such a 
business varnishes on account of reduced price or value in an attempt to 
quickly recover on the part of buyer or seller. This further adds to the lock 
jam or problem as nobody wants toxic assets. Such tentacles happen because 
of lukewarm oversight functions and lack of tighter corporate governance 
that should have challenged the stubborn managers to retreat to lower or safer 
level of profits/ambition. 
Overinvestment or enormous amount of funding was not checked either. 
Over-saturated investment/area to give way to the underinvested area is 
another problem. Look at Fannie Mae (Federal National Mortgage 
Association or Government Corporation created by Roosevelt Administration 
in U.S in 1938) providing fresh capital and liquidity to the market and 
bearing the market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk of the originators of the 
mortgage loans (bank and savings and loan Associations) by buying the 
mortgages which in effect returned the lodgments to these institutions. Its 
over-borrowed funds to finance the mortgage purchase were a big portion of 
the U.S debt. Moving this off the U.S operating budget informed the 1968 
Johnson Administration creation of Ginnea Mae (Government National 
Mortgage Association) to handle government guaranteed mortgages and 
privatised others (known as Fannie Mae) retaining some government 
obligators for low income housing. It also developed the mortgage- backed 
security to shift the market risk off the government to investors. 1970 saw the 
creation of Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) to 
securitize conventional mortgages and enable competition on the privatized 
Fannie Mae. 
Now the Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac converged through time responsible 
for the gargantuan funding of U.S mortgages in purchasing, holding and 
converting home loans into mortgage backed securities. The question is was 
there any strong oversight function or tighter corporate governance 
checkmating such huge financial giant all through to the present global 
financial melt-down? The insider management cum over-ambition must have 
been rearing its ugly head of mismanagement before the present debate of the 
Corporate Governance: Insider Information, The Bane of Financial Meltdown 
Copyright © IAARR 2011: www.afrrevjo.com  116 
Indexed African Journals Online: www.ajol.info 
melt-down. For example, by 2003 through 2006 Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac by pre 2003 government faulting them on new accounting rules were 
also challenged (making them lesser issue) by privately labelled securities 
issued by some wall Street Firms (Wells Fargo, Lehman Brothers, Bear 
Stearns, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Bank of America) and high-risk lenders 
like Indy Mac, WAMU and Countrywide. The rise of these sub- prime 
mortgage origination and securitisation, being low-rated debt securities 
became a problem. Institutional investors by their rules should not go for 
low-grade mortgages or sub-prime. Only $685 billion out of the $1.1 trillion 
sub-prime debt are sellable. Where are the new investors for the rest? The 
collateralized debt obligation (securitized) must be paid back by their 
different levels of risk and returns. The highest risk or low-rated debt suffers 
losses most. The research avers that the insider knowledge of managers 
allowing for uncontrolled or unbridled manipulations during the recent 
markets turbulence with stops in the home mortgage journey from original 
issuer to the ultimate buyer is the bane of corporate governance. This does 
not support the hypothesis that the managers are not the cause of the failure. 
The following events also, do not support the fact that the insider information 
did not cause the global financial melt-down:- 
i. Collateralized debt obligations and credit derivatives (unlike 
publicly traded securities and futures contracts) are not traded in 
exchanges but in OTC (no transparent price discounting, 
prices/volumes not disclosed, no surveillance of the market to check 
vulnerable positions strictly between customers and dealers, no 
institutionalised markets-markers/dealers to ensure liquidity).    
ii. Under-capitalised, unregulated finance companies, originators of 
mortgage loans made through banks, cannot sell their loans or get 
fresh capital or funds as bankers withdrew their support. Then their 
market will seize. The issuer of collateralized debt obligations could 
not issue more as they cannot sell their inventory of mortgages to 
repay the loans. 
iii. Sub-prime mortgage originators could not sell their loans made 
through the banks. 
iv. Hedge funds with $100 million capital can have leverage of 500% 
or borrow $500 million then add to $100 million capital to invest 
$600 million in equity. 
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v. Privately labelled mortgage-backed security issuers and originators 
(Finance Companies) can move about $3 billion ($2.4 billion for 
investment-grade senior debt securities for institutional investors) 
and $600 million high-yield junk through the sub-prime mortgage 
market. 
vi. Major Banks, broker-dealers gave guaranteed credit lines to 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and conduits, the issuers of 
commercial papers. This is to get the sub-prime assets off their 
books to avoid capital requirements. This failed. 
vii. About 3% jump in delinquency rate in US mortgages threw $57 
trillion US financial system into shudders.  
viii. Hedge funds (mortgage originators) have no capital requirements 
(unregulated in this regard) and serving as highly leveraged should 
not have handled such mortgages being unstable foundation for 
organising capital market.  
ix. There was cross-border spread of the market rupture as emerging 
market equities were sold to meet margin calls (or recover losses), 
so equity market fell World-Wide with their currencies. Northern 
Rock Bank in UK, many Germany Banks with US sub-prime 
mortgages, asset-backed commercial paper in Canada (business not 
supported by bank credit), etc, suffered.    
x. The Nigerian banking sector unethical practices namely, theft, 
duplication of check books, suppression, substitution and payment 
against un-cleared effects, defalcations, computer frauds, forgeries, 
unauthorised lending, lending to global borrowers, kite flying and 
cross-firing, foreign exchange malpractices impersonation, over-
invoicing, manipulation of vouchers, unofficial, borrowing, 
fictitious contracts, fictitious accounts, and over-valuation of status 
report. 
xi. The G-20 U.K meeting 2009 emphasis on tax havens, money 
laundering, managers mismanagement of investors’ 
funds/mortgages, over-investment/saturation, huge unpaid 
loans/debts, lack of oversight functions, lack of tighter corporate 
control, etc. in the cause of the recent global financial melt-down. 
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xii. First Bank (Nigeria) PLC share price plummeted by more than 50% 
during the Nigeria stock market crash because of the insider 
information possessed by the managers to borrow for short and lend 
for long so that they and their customers can buy shares cheap and 
sell dear later. But the Central Bank of Nigeria ordered them to 
return such money and this led to sudden selling (bearish market) 
and prices falling. Many banks were in the same boat. 
xiii. The Iceland bank was so bankrupt that it could not pay customers 
their deposits to make their daily living. 
Conclusion 
The study is on corporate governance, the insider information the bane of 
financial melt-down. The hypothesis is that the insider information or 
knowledge of the manager did not cause the global financial melt-down. 
Analytical method was used with desk research to prove the hypothesis 
wrong. For the Leviathan, the insider information or knowledge to be tamed, 
it is recommended that:     
i. Apply industry standards to securities transactions. 
ii. Check collateral (margin) use in OTC derivative and hedge fund 
borrowing. 
iii.  For CDO (collateralised debt obligation). Policy makers to set new 
reporting standards in OTC and hedge funds securities. 
iv. Dealers must be market makers. 
v.  There should be prudential regulations and such firms to be treated 
as financial institutions. 
vi. Checking corporate governance rule. 
vii. Changing global governance from traditional, elitist grouping to 
cross-boarder grouping to reduce over-investment in one area. 
viii. Increasing investment in needy or poor areas.  
ix. There should be no form of saturated investment in any one area. 
x. Tighter control, tax havens reduction, oversight function resurgence 
and market-still- free business environment.  
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xi. Government (without a Red-tape) to take a seat in the investment 
banking.  
xii. Change bankruptcy, limited status, director’s business judgement, 
shareholders’ status, to check managers’ ‘failure’ or risky 
manipulation of investors’ funds.         
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